ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN QUALITY CHOICES AND PRICE COMPETITION

We modify the price‐setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage. Our results show that there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies, whereby firms always select sequential play at the quality stage. We also investigate the mixed‐strategy equilibrium, revealing that the probability of generating outcomes out of equilibrium is higher than the probability of playing one Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In the alternative case with full market coverage, we show that the quality stage is solved in dominant strategies and therefore the choice of roles becomes irrelevant as the Nash and Stackelberg solutions coincide. With full market coverage and corner solution, the results show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, where the high‐quality firm takes the lead in the quality stage.     

Corporate social responsibility and earnings forecasting unbiasedness

We investigate the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and I/B/E/S analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) forecasts using a large sample of US firms for 1992–2011. Based on literature findings, we decompose the CSR effect into four factors: accounting opacity, corporate governance, stakeholder risk, and overinvestment. We find that all of them significantly affect both the absolute forecast error on EPS and its standard deviation controlling for forecast horizon; number of analysts and forecasts; and year, industry, and broker house effects. Consistently with our ex ante hypotheses, overinvestment, stakeholder risk, and accounting opacity have a positive effect, increasing both dependent variables, while corporate governance quality has a negative effect. A crucial aspect of our findings is that high CSR quality in terms of the four factors (i.e., accounting transparency, high corporate governance quality, stakeholder risk mitigation, and absence of overinvestment) contributes to making earnings forecasts unbiased as unbiasedness is generally met in the subsample of the Top CSR quality companies and markedly violated in the subsample of the Bottom CSR companies. We also document that overinvestment and stakeholder risk are sufficient to produce this effect.     

The methodology used by Russian statistical bodies to analyse small business

Assessing the level of development of small business in Russia requires a critical analysis of official statistics, owing to the existence of several inconsistencies. In addition, the frequent changes in the methodology make it difficult to compare the data over a period. It must also be taken into account that Russian and Western official data on small business are not fully comparable, as the Russian definition of small business has several limitations. For this reason its contribution to the economy is understated. Officially, employment in small businesses has stopped growing since 1994. Survey‐based results, however, point to a continuous increase in the number of people employed by new private enterprises, suggesting that the emergence of entrepreneurship has been an organic process, as in the leading transition countries, although it has been much slower in Russia.     

From the Nation-State to a World Society: An Institutional Reading of Globalization

This article highlights the inadequacy of classical and neoclassical theories for understanding the set of changes experienced by economic systems in their process of development. The institutional dimension concerning the issue of well-defined rules (through the introduction of economic policies) and involving all stakeholders in the regulatory process (starting from the firm), seems to better interpret micro- and macro-economic aspects of the evolving capitalist model. This means questioning the complicated economic governance and society in the transition from the nation-state to a world society (or world state).     

The role of ethics and product personality in the intention to purchase organic food products: a structural equation modeling approach

The aim of the present study is to examine the role of ethical dimensions and product personality in the purchasing intention of organic food products. The Prospect method (Caprara et al. in Test Psicomet Metodol 7(3–4):113–128, 2000), which integrates the Five factors model of personality (cf. Digman in Annu Rev Psychol 41(1):417–440, 1990) and the Theory of planned behavior (Ajzen in Organ Behav Hum Decis Process, 50(2):179–211, 1991) extended to an ethical dimension, was employed, by using a Structural Equation Modeling approach. Results showed that moral norms—i.e., personal beliefs regarding what is right or wrong (Parker et al. in Br J Soc Psychol, 34(2):127–137, 1995)—can be considered the main motivator of purchasing intention, and they are, in turn, affected by subjective norms and product personality traits of Naturalness and Authenticity. Marketing implications for firms operating in the organic food industry are discussed, in their intent to shift from a “niche” market to a broader diffusion of these products.     

Preference erosion and the developing countries exports to the EU: a dynamic panel gravity approach

The erosion of preferences due to multilateral tariff reductions is a long-standing concern for many developing countries. This paper focuses on the erosion of the preferences granted by the EU in the rice industry. Since 2004 there has been a sharp decrease in border protection for the EU rice industry. Because the EU grants trade preferences to a considerable number of rice exporting developing countries, the reform implied preference erosion as well. By addressing the impact of preference erosion on developing countries rice exports to the EU, this paper contributes two original insights to the literature: first, by proposing a new empirical approach to compute the preference margin when tariff rate quotas are in force which is based on the assumption of the existence of fixed costs and economies of scale in international trade; second, by estimating the trade elasticities of preferences by means of a dynamic panel gravity equation to deal with the issues of endogeneity of preferences and persistency in bilateral trade flows. The results show that the way preference margins are calculated matters significantly when assessing the existence and extent of their erosion and the values of trade elasticities. Finally, the estimations highlight the fact that the impact of preferences is still very strong for some of the countries concerned.     

Customer satisfaction and dissatisfaction in retail banking: Exploring the asymmetric impact of attribute performances

The paper presents the results of an extensive study on the determinants of customer satisfaction for a retail bank. In doing so, it uses a revised version of the traditional analyses based on derived measures of attribute importance. The need for a revised methodology is prompted by the insights of the two- and three-factor theories of customer satisfaction, such as Kano's framework. Indeed, the evidence from 5000 customers of a prominent Italian bank confirms a non-linear and asymmetric relationship between attribute performances and overall customer satisfaction. The results from both a traditional and our revised approach are compared. While this approach can be applied across different industries, it should not be assumed that the numerical results presented in the paper apply to contexts with substantially different underlying characteristics. General trends and implications for banking services are reported in the conclusions.     

Do minimum quality standards bite in polluting industries?

We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated duopoly where production is polluting. We examine the alternative frameworks with quality-dependent fixed or variable costs, under both price and quantity competition. Under Bertrand behaviour, the introduction of a binding MQS regulation reduces product differentiation, which causes an increase in the output and pollution. Hence its adoption must rely on the increase in consumer surplus generated by the increase in output and average quality. Conversely, in the Cournot setting, a binding MQS decreases output and pollution, and its adoption is driven by the fact that the balance between these effects and the associated increase in average quality yields a welfare improvement.     

From Deficits to Debt and Back: Political Incentives under Numerical Fiscal Rules

Under numerical fiscal rules, such as those underpinning EMU,governments have strong temptations to use accounting tricksto meet the fiscal constraints. Given these political incentives,fiscal variables that in the past were regarded as a mere residualacquire a strategic role. This is the case of the so-calledstock-flow adjustment (SFA) which reconciles deficit and debtdevelopments. We develop a simple theoretical model where deficitsand two distinct SFA components (one that could be used to reducethe deficit figures and the other to impact debt figures instead)are determined as a result of a constrained optimisation byfiscal authorities. Econometric evidence provides results consistentwith the model findings. The SFA component related to the purposeto hide deficits rises with the recorded deficit, while thesales of financial assets designed to keep the debt under controlrise with both debt and deficit. When deficits are in excessof the 3 percent limit, accounting gimmicks become more sensitiveto the size of deficits. The SGP per se does not appear to increasethe extent to which higher deficits trigger more accountinggimmicks. However, the SGP seems associated with a more intenseuse of accounting gimmicks irrespective of the level of deficit.Such accounting practices have greatly contributed to the lossof credibility of Economic and Monetary Union's fiscal rules.If properly implemented, the reformed Pact, which stresses durableadjustment and long-run sustainability, should help curb suchperverse incentives. (JEL codes: E61, H62, H87)